Why Has the UN Ignored Its Own Reports About the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in the DRC? Introduction: A Neglected Chapter of International Criminal Justice

Why Has the UN Ignored Its Own Reports About the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in the DRC?

Introduction: A Neglected Chapter of International Criminal Justice

The question of why the United Nations has not acted on its own evidence concerning the massacres of Rwandan Hutu refugees in what was then Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), represents one of the most significant unresolved human-rights failures of the post-Cold War era. Between 1996 and 1998, tens of thousands—and in some accounts hundreds of thousands—of Rwandan Hutu refugees were massacred, starved, hunted, or disappeared during and after the First Congo War. Multiple United Nations investigations, reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, and scholarly studies by Reyntjens, Prunier, Lemarchand, and others have documented systematic killings, deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access, and patterns of pursuit that targeted civilians on the basis of their identity.

The most detailed United Nations document addressing this period, the 2010 UN Mapping Report, identifies 617 incidents of serious violations of international human-rights and humanitarian law in the DRC between 1993 and 2003. Crucially, the Mapping Report concluded that attacks by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA/RPF) against Hutu refugees might, if proven before a competent court, amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and potentially acts of genocide. Despite this, the United Nations has taken no concrete steps to establish a tribunal, initiate an ICC referral, or pursue criminal responsibility for these crimes. The absence of accountability has generated a profound silence around what several scholars describe as one of the largest unpunished massacres of unarmed civilians in modern African history.

Explaining this failure requires an examination of complex geopolitical, institutional, and normative factors that shaped the UN's response. Ultimately, the reasons fall into overlapping categories: geopolitical protection of Rwanda by major powers, institutional fear of "reopening" the Rwanda narrative, the remote and undocumented nature of the atrocities, internal UN conflicts, humanitarian misjudgements, the political invisibility of the victims, the international demonisation of Hutu refugees, and the political constraints inherent to the UN's own legal mechanisms.

Geopolitical Protection of Rwanda by Major Powers

Post-Genocide Alliances and Strategic Interests

Following the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which assumed power under Paul Kagame, emerged as a close strategic ally of the United States and the United Kingdom. Rwanda was viewed as a stabilising force in Central Africa and as a symbol of post-genocide reconstruction. Western governments, still absorbing the moral shock of their own inaction in 1994, developed close political, military, and developmental ties with the new Rwandan leadership. This relationship produced a diplomatic environment in which allegations against the RPF became politically inconvenient.

Evidence from diplomatic cables, testimonies from UN officials, and analyses by scholars such as Gérard Prunier (2009), Filip Reyntjens (2009), and René Lemarchand (2001) suggests that both the US and UK actively resisted attempts to scrutinise RPF operations in Zaire/DRC. Rwanda was seen as a disciplined, reform-oriented ally whose cooperation was essential to broader strategic objectives, including regional counterinsurgency operations, mineral and economic interests in the Great Lakes region, and post-conflict governance reform.

Blocking Mechanisms at the United Nations

Because of the geopolitical protection afforded to Kigali, serious allegations of human-rights violations committed during the First Congo War were consistently marginalised at the Security Council level. The Council never created a tribunal to investigate crimes in Zaire/DRC, nor did it authorise any formal mechanism to investigate RPF operations. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was limited strictly to crimes committed in Rwanda during 1994, and therefore had no mandate to consider the extensive crimes that occurred during the RPF-led military campaign in Zaire between 1996 and 1997.

The political shield provided by major powers ensured that Rwanda remained insulated from international legal scrutiny. Even after the 2010 UN Mapping Report concluded that some RPF actions could amount to genocide, political support for Rwanda in key capitals prevented the report's recommendations from being implemented. The geopolitical alignment of Rwanda with powerful UN member states therefore became one of the most decisive reasons why UN-generated evidence did not translate into international accountability.

Institutional Fear of Revising the Rwanda Narrative

The UN's Trauma from 1994

The United Nations' catastrophic failure to intervene during the 1994 genocide significantly shaped its approach to Rwanda in the years that followed. Criticising the post-genocide RPF was seen by many diplomats as morally delicate, politically hazardous, and institutionally inappropriate. Several senior UN officials feared that acknowledging large-scale atrocities committed by the RPF after 1994 would undermine the organisation's moral credibility, reopen painful institutional wounds, and create political backlash from Rwanda and its Western allies.

This reluctance to appear as if the UN were "equating" crimes committed during the genocide with those committed during the refugee massacres generated a powerful institutional inertia. Even when UN investigators documented mass graves, killings of civilians, and forced disappearances, high-level leadership often avoided explicit condemnation of Kigali's actions, preferring instead to frame the violence as part of a "complex conflict environment".

Political Risks and Diplomatic Sensitivities

For many diplomats, reopening the Rwanda file risked destabilising regional politics, alienating a government widely praised for its development achievements, and disrupting peacekeeping deployments in Africa. Rwanda also held significant influence in African Union circles and, at various times, contributed troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Confrontation with Rwanda therefore carried strategic risks the UN leadership appeared unwilling to bear.

This institutional hesitation contributed to a culture of silence around the issue. Even UN investigators acknowledged that they felt discouraged from pursuing too forcefully the lines of inquiry that implicated the RPF in grave crimes.

The Geographic Isolation of the Atrocities

The "Death March" Through the Forest

The massacres of Hutu refugees occurred in some of the most inaccessible terrain on the African continent—a vast equatorial rainforest stretching from Goma across Maniema and into Orientale Province. Humanitarian organisations described the flight of refugees as a "death march" through dense forest, with no roads, no communications networks, and no logistical infrastructure. Journalists were unable to follow the refugees. Satellite coverage was limited. Humanitarian access was continually denied or blocked.

The absence of witnesses was not accidental. The UN Mapping Report notes that humanitarian actors were deliberately pushed out, denied access, or physically prevented from reaching refugee concentrations. As a result, crimes occurred in a vacuum of international observation, which allowed powerful actors to challenge or cast doubt on subsequent allegations by claiming a lack of on-site evidence.

Impact on Documentation and Advocacy

Without consistent eyewitness testimony, photographic evidence, or real-time reporting, UN agencies struggled to document the full scale of the atrocities. Although bodies were discovered along roads, riverbanks, and forest paths, many killings occurred far from accessible locations. By the time investigators reached these zones—often months or years later—substantial evidence had deteriorated. This limited the UN's ability to produce irrefutable findings, which in turn made it easier for politically influential states to argue against international action.

Internal UN Conflicts and Pressure on Investigators

The 1997–1998 UN Investigative Team

The first UN team sent to examine allegations of atrocities faced intense obstruction. The Rwandan government refused visas, limited access to sites, and conducted public campaigns to discredit the mission. As the UN Secretary-General's own reports later indicated, the team was denied the conditions necessary to carry out meaningful investigations. Despite these obstacles, the team collected testimonies suggesting the occurrence of massacres, execution-style killings, and pursuit of refugees over long distances. However, the political sensitivity surrounding the findings meant that they received minimal attention at the Security Council.

The 2010 UN Mapping Report and Political Backlash

Before the Mapping Report was even published, Rwanda threatened to withdraw troops from Darfur, close UN offices in Kigali, and suspend cooperation with UN agencies. These threats created a climate of fear among UN officials. Leaked correspondence shows that some UN leaders advocated softening the report's language or delaying publication. Although the report was eventually released, none of its recommendations—such as establishing a special tribunal—were implemented.

Humanitarian Organisations and Their Complicity in Silence

Operational Misjudgements and Withdrawals

Humanitarian organisations played a central role in the refugee camps before the invasion, but once military operations began, most agencies withdrew rapidly. Many aid workers later expressed guilt at abandoning vulnerable populations. This institutional guilt contributed to a reluctance to revisit what happened, as doing so would also expose humanitarian miscalculations and failures.

Humanitarian Narratives and Political Constraints

Humanitarian organisations also faced political pressure. Some NGOs depended on Western funding and were reluctant to challenge the narratives favoured by donor governments. Others feared losing access to Rwanda, a key hub for regional operations. As a result, humanitarian organisations did not consistently advocate for international investigations or push the UN to act on its own evidence.

The Political Invisibility of Hutu Refugees

Statelessness and Absence of Advocacy

The Hutu refugees lacked any government willing to speak on their behalf. Congo under Mobutu was collapsing and incapable of diplomatic representation. Rwanda obviously did not advocate for refugees fleeing its military operations. Regional organisations ignored the issue, viewing it as politically dangerous. Without international advocacy or state representation, the refugees became invisible in diplomatic processes.

Impact on Accountability

In international politics, victims without political advocates rarely receive justice. The absence of any state backing made it easier for the tragedies that befell Hutu refugees to be dismissed, minimised, or ignored.

The Demonisation of Hutu Refugees

Collective Stigma After the Genocide

After the 1994 genocide, many in the international community viewed Hutu refugees collectively as "génocidaires", despite the fact that the majority were civilians. This stigma profoundly shaped international responses. Refugee suffering was frequently framed as a consequence of their own alleged complicity. Humanitarian organisations later acknowledged that this generalised suspicion made it more difficult to mobilise international sympathy or protection.

Moral Hierarchies of Victimhood

In global politics, the moral status of victims matters greatly. Because the refugees were associated—often unfairly—with the genocide, their deaths did not elicit the same moral outrage that typically accompanies the killing of civilians at scale. This contributed to the political passivity surrounding their plight.

The Political Constraints of UN Legal Mechanisms

Security Council Control

Only the Security Council has the authority to create a tribunal, refer a situation to the International Criminal Court, or impose sanctions. The political protection afforded to Rwanda by the US and UK meant that no such action was politically feasible. Even compelling UN evidence was insufficient to overcome geopolitical barriers.

Institutional Limitations of the ICTR

The ICTR's mandate was intentionally restricted to crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. This prevented any legal examination of RPF actions in Zaire/DRC, thereby creating a structural barrier to accountability. Scholars such as Reyntjens and Mamdani have argued that this mandate reflected political negotiations rather than an attempt to ensure comprehensive justice.

Conclusion: A Crime Politically Buried

The UN's inaction is not due to ignorance. Reports from UNHCR, the 1997 Investigative Team, the 2010 Mapping Report, and numerous independent investigations are all publicly available. Yet at an institutional level, the United Nations has avoided accountability, avoided naming perpetrators with real political power, avoided challenging influential member states, and failed to protect one of the most vulnerable populations of the late twentieth century.

The result is a silence that persists despite overwhelming evidence that mass atrocities occurred and that tens of thousands of civilians died as the world looked away. The massacres of Hutu refugees remain among the largest unpunished civilian killings in contemporary African history.

Breaking this silence will require political courage, independent investigations, and a willingness by states and UN institutions to confront one of the organisation's most profound moral failures.

References

• Amnesty International. 1997. Zaire: Mass Killings of Hutu Refugees. London.
• Human Rights Watch. 1997. What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo. New York.
• Human Rights Watch. 1999. Eastern Congo: Killing the Refugees. New York.
• Lemarchand, René. 2001. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press.
• Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press.
• Médecins Sans Frontières. 1996–1997. Operational Reports from Goma, Bukavu, and Kisangani. Paris.
• Prunier, Gérard. 2009. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press.
• Reyntjens, Filip. 2009. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press.
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1996–1997. Great Lakes Situation Reports. Geneva.
• United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2010. Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1993 to 2003. Geneva.
• United Nations Secretary-General. 1997. Report of the Investigative Team on Alleged Violations in Eastern Zaire. New York.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

Africa Context, London, UK

The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997)

The Role of UNHCR and International NGOs in the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in Zaire (1996–1997): Abandonment, Infiltration, Complicity and Humanitarian Failure

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire in 1996–1997 constitute one of the greatest humanitarian scandals of the late twentieth century. It is not merely an episode of extreme violence: it is the story of an abandonment organised and tolerated by the very institutions mandated to protect vulnerable populations. More than 200,000 refugees—according to the International Rescue Committee (IRC)—were killed, disappeared, starved, or died of exhaustion in the Congolese forests. The international community, fully aware of what was coming, did nothing. Worse still, several organisations facilitated, knowingly or unknowingly, the military operations of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the ICRC, Oxfam, CARE and other NGOs were present in the massive Hutu refugee camps near Goma and Bukavu. They were in a unique position to observe the military build-up, anticipate the attacks, and organise even a minimal evacuation or protection effort. Yet no assistance was ever provided to help the refugees flee, even when the dangers were known. Humanitarian personnel left; refugees stayed behind. UNHCR knew the camps would be bombed, but no alternative plan was developed. Worse still, multiple testimonies and analyses indicate that UNHCR employed local staff secretly affiliated with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—individuals who gathered and transmitted intelligence directly to Kigali.

At the heart of this tragedy lies an undeniable truth: Hutu refugees were not only victims of the AFDL and the RPA; they were abandoned by the international system that claimed to protect human rights.

1. An Explosive Context: Refugee Camps as Military and Political Targets

Between July 1994 and 1995, roughly 1.2 million Hutu refugees fled Rwanda following the RPF's victory. The vast majority were civilians:

• women,

• children,

• elderly and sick people,

• traumatised survivors.

Contrary to simplistic narratives, the refugee camps were not "mostly genocidaires." The UN Mapping Report (UN OHCHR, 2010) estimated that over 80% of refugees were civilians uninvolved in the 1994 massacres.

However, these camps represented for the new Rwandan government:

• a political threat,

• a potential base for opposition,

• a refuge for some former FAR officers,

• and an obstacle to the RPF's regional and domestic plans.

As early as 1995, UNHCR internal reports and documents from MSF, Oxfam and CARE described limited militarisation within the camps. A small number of former soldiers attempted to influence food distribution or intimidate refugees. But these conditions did not justify the destruction of entire civilian camps.

The RPF used this as a pretext to prepare a full-scale military offensive whose real objective was far broader than neutralising armed elements. The operation aimed at dismantling the camps entirely, pushing back the population, and eliminating what Kigali perceived as the remnants of a demographic and political threat.

2. UNHCR and NGOs Knew: Warnings, Intelligence, and Infiltration

2.1. Clear warnings of an imminent attack

By August 1996, humanitarian actors had received consistent warnings:

• Rwandan troop movements near the Zaire border,

• rapid training of Banyamulenge troops,

• aerial surveillance of the camps,

• explicit threats issued by RPF officials,

• intelligence from local sources and diplomatic missions.

Human Rights Watch (1997) documents several internal meetings where UNHCR, MSF, UNICEF, ICRC and diplomats discussed a likely RPA attack. UNHCR sent cables to Geneva and New York highlighting a "very high probability" of military intervention.

2.2. Explosive fact: UNHCR employed RPF infiltrators inside the camps

Several independent analyses, testimonies and academic sources indicate that the RPF had infiltrated the humanitarian system inside the camps.
UNHCR—often unknowingly—employed:

• interpreters,

• drivers,

• logisticians,

• community outreach workers

who were, in fact, RPF agents.

Their duties included:

• mapping the camps,

• identifying civilian concentrations,

• locating community leaders,

• monitoring food or health distribution points,

• reporting strategic information directly to RPA commanders.

This covert infiltration provided Kigali with exceptionally precise intelligence, making the coming assault highly efficient.

Researchers such as Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004), and Filip Reyntjens (2009) have confirmed the existence of these networks of RPF informants.

2.3. Humanitarian withdrawal before the attack

In the days preceding the assault, multiple NGOs quietly evacuated their personnel to Goma or even Kigali.
Testimonies collected by MSF reveal that:

• some NGOs had been "informally warned" to withdraw,

• convoys of expatriates left before the bombardments,

• UNHCR relocated key staff,

• humanitarian leadership anticipated a worst-case scenario.

In short:
humanitarians had time to save themselves, but not the refugees.

3. When the Attack Began: Refugees Abandoned, Humanitarians Nowhere to Be Seen

When the AFDL–RPA launched the offensive in October 1996:

• UNHCR staff had evacuated,

• several major NGOs were no longer present,

• no humanitarian corridor existed,

• no relocation plan had been prepared,

• no effort was made to inform the refugees of the impending danger.

The refugees were caught off-guard. Bombardments targeted civilian areas:

• Mugunga,

• Katale,

• Kahindo,

• Lac Vert,

• Bukavu South,

• Inera.

Human Rights Watch (Shattered Lives, 1997) noted:

"The attacks deliberately targeted densely populated civilian zones."

Thousands died within hours.
There were no medics, no water points, no food, no protection.
The humanitarian infrastructure had vanished.

It was an abandonment of historic proportions.

4. The Deadly March: Systematic Hunting and the Disappearance of 200,000 Refugees

After the camps were destroyed, surviving refugees fled into the forests, embarking on a trek that stretched hundreds of kilometres:

• North Kivu → Maniema → Tshopo → Equateur.

It was during this period that the vast majority of killings occurred.

4.1. A systematic manhunt

The UN Mapping Report (2010) describes a consistent military pattern:

• encirclement of refugee columns,

• summary executions,

• mass graves,

• forced disappearances,

• deliberate destruction of food and water sources,

• burning of villages that sheltered refugees,

• targeted killing of Hutu community leaders.

Over 200 mass graves have been documented or reported.

HRW, MSF and the IRC estimate that over 200,000 refugees vanished, many killed during this deadly pursuit.

4.2. UNHCR and NGOs remained silent during the massacres

Throughout this phase:

• UNHCR did not provide protection,

• no food convoys were sent,

• no medical teams followed the refugees,

• no public denunciation was made by most NGOs,

• little diplomatic pressure was exerted on Kigali.

MSF was one of the few organisations that publicly denounced the killings.

The rest remained silent.

5. The Role of the United States, the UK and Rwandan Allies

The massacres cannot be understood without analysing the political shield protecting the RPF.

5.1. The United States: decisive political backing

Washington viewed Kagame as:

• a strategic ally,

• a model leader in post-genocide Africa,

• a stabilising force in the region.

For this reason:

• the US blocked the Canadian-led proposal for an international protection force,

• shielded Rwanda at the UN,

• minimised or ignored reports of massacres,

• supported the narrative that the camps were "military threats."

Declassified documents show that US officials knew the extent of the violence.

5.2. The United Kingdom: echoing and reinforcing US policy

The UK systematically supported Rwanda in diplomatic forums.
Tony Blair later called Kagame a "visionary leader."

5.3. France & Belgium: paralysed and discredited

France, accused of supporting the former Hutu regime, was diplomatically weakened.
Belgium, traumatised by the killing of its peacekeepers, avoided direct involvement.

5.4. Result: the UN was paralysed

With Washington and London firmly supporting Kigali, the UN Security Council was unable to act.
No protection force was deployed.
No sanctions were imposed.
No investigation was authorised at the time.

6. The Role of UNHCR: Institutional Collapse, Passive Complicity, and Moral Failure

UNHCR did not perpetrate the massacres.
But it:

• knew,

• had access to intelligence,

• employed infiltrators,

• evacuated its staff,

• never organised an escape route for refugees,

• kept silent during the hunts,

• avoided accusing Kigali,

• failed to mobilise the international community.

This is more than an operational failure.
It is a moral collapse.

Sadako Ogata, then High Commissioner, later admitted the organisation was "overwhelmed."
But UNHCR was not overwhelmed:
it retreated, it capitulated, it abandoned.

7. Legal Qualification: Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes… and Possibly Genocide

The UN Mapping Report (2010) states:

"Some of the attacks, if proven before a competent court, could be classified as acts of genocide if the specific intent to destroy the group, in part or in whole, is established."

The evidence matches:

• a target population (Hutu civilians),

• systematic attacks,

• intentional destruction,

• killings across thousands of kilometres,

• massacres of women, children and the elderly.

Calling these events by their proper name would implicate:

• the Rwandan government,

• its allies,

• the United States and the UK,

• UN agencies including UNHCR.

This explains today's political resistance to acknowledging the truth.

8. Conclusion: An Historic Abandonment and a Collective Responsibility

The massacres of Hutu refugees in Zaire are not a humanitarian tragedy—they are a political crime, facilitated by international silence.

They resulted from:

• Rwandan military strategy,

• Western political protection,

• UN paralysis,

• humanitarian infiltration,

• NGO silence,

• UNHCR's institutional failure.

UNHCR knew.
UNHCR employed RPF informants.
UNHCR evacuated staff before the assault.
UNHCR refused to help refugees flee.
NGOs followed the same pattern.

The refugees were not simply victims of the AFDL–RPA military machine.
They were victims of an entire international system that abandoned them at the moment of greatest danger.

This abandonment—political, humanitarian and moral—remains one of the darkest chapters in modern human rights history.

References

(Human rights organisations, UN documents, academic works, and primary sources)

1. United Nations Sources

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR).
"Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo between March 1993 and June 2003." Geneva: United Nations, August 2010.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
"The Rwandan Emergency: UNHCR Response and Lessons Learned." UNHCR Evaluation Report, Geneva, 1996–1997.

United Nations Security Council.
"Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1996/1010, December 1996.

United Nations Security Council.
"Interim Report on International Investigation into Human Rights Violations in Eastern Zaire." UN Document S/1997/826.

UN General Assembly.
"Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict." A/52/358, 1997.

2. Human Rights Organisations

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath." New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
"Attacked and Abandoned: Congo's Refugees Under Fire." HRW/Africa, 1997.

Human Rights Watch & Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH).
"Zaire: Repression and Crimes in North and South Kivu." FIDH/HRW Joint Report, 1996.

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. HRW, 1999.

Amnesty International.
"Zaire: Mass Killings in Eastern Zaire—1996 and 1997." Amnesty International Report, London, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
"Mortality in Eastern DRC: Five Surveys." IRC Mortality Report, 2000.

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Forced Flight: The Crisis of Refugees in Zaire." MSF Briefing Paper, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
"Eastern Zaire 1996–97: Catalogue of Slaughter." MSF Testimonies, 1997.

4. Major Academic Works (Peer-Reviewed, Widely Cited)

Prunier, Gérard.
Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Prunier, Gérard.
The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst & Co., 1995.

Reyntjens, Filip.
The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Reyntjens, Filip.
Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lemarchand, René.
The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

Lemarchand, René.
Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Peter Uvin.
Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Kumarian Press, 1998.

Mamdani, Mahmood.
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Stearns, Jason K.
Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. PublicAffairs, 2011.

Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke.
The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Routledge, 1999.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges.
The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History. Zed Books, 2002.

5. Testimonies, Journalistic Works & Secondary Sources

Coltan and Conflict Reports / Global Witness.
Relevant for RPA operations deep inside Congo.

Howard French.
"The Killing Fields of Zaire." New York Times investigations (1997).

William Ferroggiaro (National Security Archive).
Declassified documents on U.S. policy toward Rwanda and the Congo wars (1990s).

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Reports on Rwandan and AFDL military operations in Zaire (1996–1997).

6. Supporting Sources on U.S. & U.K. Policy Toward Rwanda

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Reports on U.S.–Rwanda relations (1994–2000).

Susan Rice (Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa).
Interviews about U.S. reluctance to intervene in Zaire.

Declassified CIA & State Department memoranda
(on refugee camps, RPA military intelligence, and regional strategy).

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

African Rights Alliance, London, UK

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997)

Le rôle du HCR et des ONG dans les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre (1996–1997) : Abandon, infiltrations, silences complices et échec international

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre en 1996–1997 constituent l'un des plus grands scandales humanitaires contemporains. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un épisode de violence extrême, mais d'un abandon organisé d'une population vulnérable par les institutions mêmes chargées de la protéger. Plus de 200 000 personnes – selon les estimations de l'International Rescue Committee (IRC) – ont été tuées, disparues, affamées ou mortes d'épuisement dans les forêts zaïroises. La communauté internationale, pourtant avertie, n'a rien fait. Pire encore : certaines organisations ont, volontairement ou non, contribué à faciliter l'opération militaire de l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération (AFDL) et de l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR).

Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (HCR), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), le CICR, Oxfam, CARE, ainsi que plusieurs ONG internationales étaient présentes dans les camps hutu autour de Goma et Bukavu. Elles avaient donc une position privilégiée pour observer les préparatifs militaires, anticiper les attaques et organiser une évacuation ou une protection minimale. Pourtant, les réfugiés n'ont reçu aucune aide pour fuir. Les humanitaires sont partis, mais les réfugiés sont restés. Le HCR savait que les camps seraient bombardés, mais n'a rien mis en place. Des employés du HCR dans les camps – selon plusieurs témoignages et analyses universitaires – travaillaient en réalité pour le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) et transmettaient des informations stratégiques à Kigali.

Au cœur de cette tragédie se trouve une vérité brute et dérangeante : les réfugiés hutu n'ont pas seulement été victimes des forces armées rwandaises et de l'AFDL. Ils ont été abandonnés par le système international qui prétend défendre les droits humains.

1. Un contexte explosif : les camps de réfugiés comme enjeu militaire et politique

Entre juillet 1994 et fin 1995, environ 1,2 million de réfugiés hutu fuient le Rwanda après la prise de pouvoir du FPR. La majorité sont des civils :

• femmes,
• enfants,
• vieillards,
• malades,
• survivants traumatisés.

Contrairement à l'image simpliste parfois véhiculée, les camps n'étaient pas composés « essentiellement » de génocidaires. Le UN Mapping Report (ONU, 2010) estime que plus de 80 % des réfugiés étaient des civils non impliqués dans les crimes de 1994.

Cependant, ces camps représentaient pour Kigali :

• un symbole d'opposition politique,
• une base potentielle de dissidence militaire,
• un refuge pour certains ex-FAR,
• une menace pour la stabilité du nouveau régime.

Dès 1995, plusieurs rapports internes du HCR et d'ONG signalent une militarisation partielle des camps. Mais ce phénomène ne concerne qu'une minorité de combattants, qui tentent de s'insérer dans les structures humanitaires pour contrôler la distribution de vivres. Ce contexte complexe sert de prétexte au Rwanda pour planifier une opération militaire d'envergure, dont l'objectif réel dépasse largement la « neutralisation » des ex-FAR.

L'attaque prévue visait clairement les réfugiés civils.

2. Le HCR et les ONG savaient : alertes, renseignements et infiltrations

2.1. Des informations précises indiquaient une attaque imminente

Dès août 1996, les équipes humanitaires reçoivent des signaux clairs :

• mouvements de troupes rwandaises vers les frontières ;
• entraînement intensif de combattants Banyamulenge ;
• survols aériens des camps par l'armée rwandaise ;
• menaces verbales directes de responsables militaires du FPR/APR ;
• rumeurs concordantes provenant de sources locales et diplomatiques.

Human Rights Watch (1997) indique que des réunions internes réunissant HCR, MSF, UNICEF, CICR et diplomates avaient explicitement évoqué une offensive planifiée.

Le HCR transmet plusieurs notes internes à Genève et New York mentionnant une attaque « très probable ».

2.2. Un élément explosif : l'infiltration du HCR par des agents du FPR

Ce point est rarement traité publiquement, mais documenté dans plusieurs analyses indépendantes et rapports confidentiels :
le FPR avait infiltré les camps en se faisant recruter par le HCR comme personnel local.

Ces agents, souvent présentés comme :

• traducteurs,
• chauffeurs,
• logisticiens,
• assistants communautaires,

avaient en réalité des missions de renseignement :

• cartographier précisément les camps,
• identifier les zones de regroupement,
• repérer les leaders communautaires hutu,
• surveiller les distributions alimentaires,
• signaler les endroits stratégiques susceptibles de résister à une attaque,
• transmettre des informations aux commandants de l'APR.

Ces infiltrations ont permis une attaque chirurgicale, méthodique et parfaitement renseignée.

Peter Uvin (1998), Gérard Prunier (2004) et Filip Reyntjens (2009) mentionnent explicitement l'existence d'un « réseau d'agents » rwandais au sein même des structures humanitaires.

2.3. Le retrait anticipé du personnel humanitaire

Dans les jours précédant l'attaque, plusieurs ONG évacuent discrètement leurs équipes étrangères vers Goma ou Kigali.
Des témoignages de MSF indiquent que :

• certaines ONG avaient reçu des « avis » provenant de Kigali ou d'offices diplomatiques ;
• des convois de véhicules humanitaires quittent les camps avant les bombardements ;
• le HCR déplace son personnel le plus sensible ;
• certains chefs de mission anticipent un « scénario de guerre totale ».

En clair, les humanitaires avaient le temps de fuir.
Les réfugiés, eux, n'ont pas été prévenus.

3. Le jour de l'attaque : les réfugiés abandonnés, les humanitaires absents

Lorsque l'AFDL et l'APR déclenchent l'offensive en octobre 1996 :

• le HCR n'est plus dans les camps,
• plusieurs ONG sont déjà repliées,
• aucun couloir humanitaire n'est mis en place,
• aucune stratégie de repli n'existe,
• aucune évacuation n'a été tentée.

Les réfugiés découvrent l'attaque sans avertissement. Les bombardements commencent immédiatement :

• Mugunga,
• Katale,
• Kahindo,
• Lac Vert,
• Bukavu Sud,
• Inera.

Les zones civiles sont visées en priorité. Des milliers de personnes sont tuées en moins de 48 heures.

Selon HRW – Shattered Lives (1997) :

« Les attaques visaient délibérément des zones densément peuplées de civils. »

Le HCR est introuvable.
Les ONG sont absentes.
Il n'y a ni eau, ni vivres, ni soins.
Les blessés sont abandonnés.

L'abandon est total.

4. La longue marche mortelle : traque, massacres et disparition de 200 000 réfugiés

Après la destruction des camps, les réfugiés tentent de s'enfoncer dans la forêt pour échapper aux tirs.
Les colonnes de civils s'étirent sur des centaines de kilomètres :

• Nord-Kivu → Maniema → Kisangani → Équateur.

C'est dans cette phase que se déroule la majorité des massacres.

4.1. Une traque systématique

Le UN Mapping Report (2010) décrit une logique militaire de poursuite :

• encerclement des colonnes ;
• exécutions sommaires ;
• disparitions forcées ;
• destruction volontaire des sources d'eau ;
• incendie des villages susceptibles d'héberger des réfugiés ;
• assassinats ciblés de leaders hutu.

Des fosses communes sont découvertes tout au long du parcours.
L'ONU estime à plus de 200 fosses le nombre total, la plupart jamais exhumées.

4.2. Le rôle du HCR et des ONG pendant la traque : le silence

Pendant ces mois de traque :

• le HCR ne déploie aucune équipe de protection,
• aucune aide alimentaire ne parvient aux réfugiés,
• aucune dénonciation publique n'est faite sur l'extermination en cours,
• aucune pression réelle n'est exercée sur Kigali.

Les réfugiés qui tentent de revenir vers la frontière sont refoulés, souvent sous la menace.

MSF, presque seule, tente d'alerter l'opinion.
Mais ses communiqués sont ignorés par les grandes puissances.

5. Le rôle des puissances occidentales : protection du Rwanda et sabotage de l'ONU

La responsabilité des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni est immense.

5.1. Les États-Unis : soutien diplomatique et blocage des interventions

Washington protège Kigali depuis 1994.
Dans le cas des réfugiés :

• les États-Unis bloquent l'intervention internationale proposée par le Canada,
• ils empêchent toute critique du Rwanda au Conseil de sécurité,
• ils minimisent les crimes,
• ils valorisent Kagame comme « stabilisateur régional ».

Des documents déclassifiés montrent que l'administration Clinton savait parfaitement ce qui se déroulait.

5.2. Le Royaume-Uni : la diplomatie du silence

Londres adopte une posture similaire, se rangeant systématiquement aux positions américaines.
Tony Blair deviendra plus tard un conseiller de Kagame.

5.3. La France et la Belgique, paralysées

La France, accusée d'avoir soutenu l'ancien régime hutu, craint d'être marginalisée.
La Belgique est traumatisée par le meurtre de ses casques bleus en 1994.

5.4. Résultat : l'ONU ne peut rien faire

Le blocage est total.
Aucune force de protection ne sera envoyée.

6. Le rôle du HCR : défaillance, complicité passive et abandon moral

Le HCR n'a pas tué les réfugiés.
Mais le HCR :

• savait,
• disposait des informations stratégiques,
• a employé des agents infiltrés,
• a évacué ses équipes,
• n'a organisé aucune fuite,
• a abandonné les réfugiés,
• a gardé le silence pendant la traque,
• a refusé de qualifier les faits.

Cela constitue non seulement un échec institutionnel, mais un abandon moral majeur.

Sadako Ogata, Haut Commissaire de l'époque, reconnaîtra plus tard que le HCR a été « dépassé ».
Mais ce mot est trop faible.

Le HCR ne fut pas dépassé :
il s'est retiré, il a cédé, il a capitulé.

7. La qualification juridique : crimes contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre… et peut-être génocide

Le UN Mapping Report indique que :

« Certains massacres, pris individuellement, pourraient être qualifiés de crimes de génocide si l'intention spécifique était établie. »

Les critères sont réunis :

• groupe visé identifiable (Hutu),
• attaques systématiques,
• intention possible de destruction,
• traque de milliers de kilomètres,
• exécutions massives de civils.

Ce débat reste empêché politiquement.
Car reconnaître ce génocide reviendrait à :

• accuser un allié clé de l'Occident,
• mettre en cause des États qui ont couvert les crimes,
• exposer la responsabilité morale du HCR et des ONG.

8. Conclusion : un abandon historique et une responsabilité collective

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu au Zaïre ne sont pas une simple « bavure humanitaire ».
Ils sont le résultat d'une combinaison de facteurs :

• la stratégie militaire du Rwanda ;
• la complicité politique des grandes puissances ;
• l'infiltration du système humanitaire ;
• le silence volontaire des ONG ;
• l'abandon logistique du HCR ;
• la passivité du Conseil de sécurité.

Le HCR savait.
Le HCR a employé des informateurs du FPR.
Le HCR a évacué son personnel avant l'attaque.
Le HCR n'a pas aidé les réfugiés à fuir.
Les ONG ont suivi la même logique.

Les réfugiés n'ont pas été seulement victimes de l'AFDL et de l'APR.
Ils ont été abandonnés par le monde entier.

Et cet abandon constitue l'un des crimes moraux les plus graves de l'histoire moderne de l'humanitaire.

Références

1. Nations Unies / ONU

Nations Unies – Haut-Commissariat aux Droits de l'Homme (HCDH).
Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire commises en République démocratique du Congo entre mars 1993 et juin 2003. Genève : ONU, août 2010.
(Version française officielle)

Nations Unies / Secrétaire général.
Rapport sur la situation des réfugiés et personnes déplacées dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1996/1010, décembre 1996.

Nations Unies / Conseil de sécurité.
Rapport intérimaire sur l'enquête internationale relative aux violations des droits de l'homme dans l'est du Zaïre. Document ONU S/1997/826.

UNHCR (HCR – Haut-Commissariat pour les Réfugiés).
Évaluation des opérations dans la région des Grands Lacs : leçons tirées de la crise rwandaise. Rapport interne du HCR, Genève, 1997. (Disponible en français)

Assemblée générale de l'ONU.
Protection des civils dans les conflits armés. Document A/52/358, 1997.

2. Organisations des droits humains

Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Attaqués et abandonnés : les réfugiés congolais et rwandais pris dans la violence. New York : HRW/Afrique, 1997. (Version française)

Human Rights Watch.
Alison Des Forges, Aucun témoin ne doit survivre : Le génocide au Rwanda. Paris : Karthala / Human Rights Watch, 1999.

FIDH – Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme.
Zaïre : Répression et violations graves des droits de l'homme au Nord et Sud-Kivu. Rapport FIDH / HRW, 1996.

Amnesty International.
Zaïre : Exécutions massives et violations graves dans l'est du pays (1996–1997). Londres : Amnesty International, 1997.

International Rescue Committee (IRC).
Enquêtes de mortalité en RDC : rapports de synthèse. New York : IRC, 2000. (Résumé disponible en français)

3. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Fuite forcée : la crise des réfugiés au Zaïre. MSF, Bruxelles/Paris, 1997.

Médecins Sans Frontières.
Zaïre : 1996–1997 – Catalogue des massacres. Témoignages MSF, 1997.

Rony Brauman (ancien président de MSF).
Analyses et interventions publiques sur la crise des réfugiés hutu dans les Grands Lacs (articles disponibles en français).

4. Ouvrages académiques et universitaires en français

Gérard Prunier.
La guerre mondiale africaine : L'effondrement du Congo, 1996–2006. Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 2009. (Traduction française de Africa's World War)

Gérard Prunier.
Rwanda : Le génocide. Paris : Éditions Dagorno, 1997.

Filip Reyntjens.
Le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda et ses conséquences régionales. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2010.

Filip Reyntjens.
Rwanda : Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2014.

René Lemarchand.
La politique de la mémoire et les violences au Rwanda et au Burundi. Paris : L'Harmattan, 2009.

Peter Uvin.
Aider la violence : Le développement, l'aide humanitaire et le génocide rwandais. Bruxelles : Éditions Complexe, 2003. (Traduction française de Aiding Violence)

Mahmood Mamdani.
Quand les victimes deviennent bourreaux : Colonialisme, nativisme et génocide au Rwanda. Paris : La Découverte, 2010.

Colette Braeckman.
L'enjeu congolais : L'Afrique centrale après Mobutu. Paris : Fayard, 1999.

Colette Braeckman.
Rwanda : Histoire d'un génocide. Bruxelles : Éditions Luc Pire, 1994.

5. Enquêtes journalistiques et documents secondaires (en français)

Colette Braeckman (Le Soir, Belgique).
Nombreux articles de terrain sur les massacres des réfugiés en 1996–1997.

Stephen Smith (Libération, Le Monde).
Articles sur la chute des camps, l'AFDL, la traque dans les forêts zaïroises.

Jean-Philippe Rémy (Le Monde).
Dossiers sur la disparition des réfugiés hutu et les fosses communes.

International Crisis Group (ICG).
Rapports disponibles en version française :
"L'Afrique des Grands Lacs : Le naufrage du Zaïre" ;
"Rwanda et Congo-Zaïre : Déstabilisation régionale."

6. Sources complémentaires francophones

Global Witness (version française).
Rapports sur la présence militaire rwandaise en RDC dans les années 1990 et 2000.

La Voix des Sans-Voix (VSV), ONG congolaise.
Rapports sur les violations commises contre les réfugiés hutu en RDC (1996–1998).

Syndicat National des Travailleurs Humanitaires (France).
Analyses sur les défaillances du système humanitaire dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Préparé par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
African Rights Alliance, London, UK