Why Has the UN Ignored Its Own Reports About the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in the DRC? Introduction: A Neglected Chapter of International Criminal Justice

Why Has the UN Ignored Its Own Reports About the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in the DRC?

Introduction: A Neglected Chapter of International Criminal Justice

The question of why the United Nations has not acted on its own evidence concerning the massacres of Rwandan Hutu refugees in what was then Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), represents one of the most significant unresolved human-rights failures of the post-Cold War era. Between 1996 and 1998, tens of thousands—and in some accounts hundreds of thousands—of Rwandan Hutu refugees were massacred, starved, hunted, or disappeared during and after the First Congo War. Multiple United Nations investigations, reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, and scholarly studies by Reyntjens, Prunier, Lemarchand, and others have documented systematic killings, deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access, and patterns of pursuit that targeted civilians on the basis of their identity.

The most detailed United Nations document addressing this period, the 2010 UN Mapping Report, identifies 617 incidents of serious violations of international human-rights and humanitarian law in the DRC between 1993 and 2003. Crucially, the Mapping Report concluded that attacks by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA/RPF) against Hutu refugees might, if proven before a competent court, amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and potentially acts of genocide. Despite this, the United Nations has taken no concrete steps to establish a tribunal, initiate an ICC referral, or pursue criminal responsibility for these crimes. The absence of accountability has generated a profound silence around what several scholars describe as one of the largest unpunished massacres of unarmed civilians in modern African history.

Explaining this failure requires an examination of complex geopolitical, institutional, and normative factors that shaped the UN's response. Ultimately, the reasons fall into overlapping categories: geopolitical protection of Rwanda by major powers, institutional fear of "reopening" the Rwanda narrative, the remote and undocumented nature of the atrocities, internal UN conflicts, humanitarian misjudgements, the political invisibility of the victims, the international demonisation of Hutu refugees, and the political constraints inherent to the UN's own legal mechanisms.

Geopolitical Protection of Rwanda by Major Powers

Post-Genocide Alliances and Strategic Interests

Following the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which assumed power under Paul Kagame, emerged as a close strategic ally of the United States and the United Kingdom. Rwanda was viewed as a stabilising force in Central Africa and as a symbol of post-genocide reconstruction. Western governments, still absorbing the moral shock of their own inaction in 1994, developed close political, military, and developmental ties with the new Rwandan leadership. This relationship produced a diplomatic environment in which allegations against the RPF became politically inconvenient.

Evidence from diplomatic cables, testimonies from UN officials, and analyses by scholars such as Gérard Prunier (2009), Filip Reyntjens (2009), and René Lemarchand (2001) suggests that both the US and UK actively resisted attempts to scrutinise RPF operations in Zaire/DRC. Rwanda was seen as a disciplined, reform-oriented ally whose cooperation was essential to broader strategic objectives, including regional counterinsurgency operations, mineral and economic interests in the Great Lakes region, and post-conflict governance reform.

Blocking Mechanisms at the United Nations

Because of the geopolitical protection afforded to Kigali, serious allegations of human-rights violations committed during the First Congo War were consistently marginalised at the Security Council level. The Council never created a tribunal to investigate crimes in Zaire/DRC, nor did it authorise any formal mechanism to investigate RPF operations. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was limited strictly to crimes committed in Rwanda during 1994, and therefore had no mandate to consider the extensive crimes that occurred during the RPF-led military campaign in Zaire between 1996 and 1997.

The political shield provided by major powers ensured that Rwanda remained insulated from international legal scrutiny. Even after the 2010 UN Mapping Report concluded that some RPF actions could amount to genocide, political support for Rwanda in key capitals prevented the report's recommendations from being implemented. The geopolitical alignment of Rwanda with powerful UN member states therefore became one of the most decisive reasons why UN-generated evidence did not translate into international accountability.

Institutional Fear of Revising the Rwanda Narrative

The UN's Trauma from 1994

The United Nations' catastrophic failure to intervene during the 1994 genocide significantly shaped its approach to Rwanda in the years that followed. Criticising the post-genocide RPF was seen by many diplomats as morally delicate, politically hazardous, and institutionally inappropriate. Several senior UN officials feared that acknowledging large-scale atrocities committed by the RPF after 1994 would undermine the organisation's moral credibility, reopen painful institutional wounds, and create political backlash from Rwanda and its Western allies.

This reluctance to appear as if the UN were "equating" crimes committed during the genocide with those committed during the refugee massacres generated a powerful institutional inertia. Even when UN investigators documented mass graves, killings of civilians, and forced disappearances, high-level leadership often avoided explicit condemnation of Kigali's actions, preferring instead to frame the violence as part of a "complex conflict environment".

Political Risks and Diplomatic Sensitivities

For many diplomats, reopening the Rwanda file risked destabilising regional politics, alienating a government widely praised for its development achievements, and disrupting peacekeeping deployments in Africa. Rwanda also held significant influence in African Union circles and, at various times, contributed troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Confrontation with Rwanda therefore carried strategic risks the UN leadership appeared unwilling to bear.

This institutional hesitation contributed to a culture of silence around the issue. Even UN investigators acknowledged that they felt discouraged from pursuing too forcefully the lines of inquiry that implicated the RPF in grave crimes.

The Geographic Isolation of the Atrocities

The "Death March" Through the Forest

The massacres of Hutu refugees occurred in some of the most inaccessible terrain on the African continent—a vast equatorial rainforest stretching from Goma across Maniema and into Orientale Province. Humanitarian organisations described the flight of refugees as a "death march" through dense forest, with no roads, no communications networks, and no logistical infrastructure. Journalists were unable to follow the refugees. Satellite coverage was limited. Humanitarian access was continually denied or blocked.

The absence of witnesses was not accidental. The UN Mapping Report notes that humanitarian actors were deliberately pushed out, denied access, or physically prevented from reaching refugee concentrations. As a result, crimes occurred in a vacuum of international observation, which allowed powerful actors to challenge or cast doubt on subsequent allegations by claiming a lack of on-site evidence.

Impact on Documentation and Advocacy

Without consistent eyewitness testimony, photographic evidence, or real-time reporting, UN agencies struggled to document the full scale of the atrocities. Although bodies were discovered along roads, riverbanks, and forest paths, many killings occurred far from accessible locations. By the time investigators reached these zones—often months or years later—substantial evidence had deteriorated. This limited the UN's ability to produce irrefutable findings, which in turn made it easier for politically influential states to argue against international action.

Internal UN Conflicts and Pressure on Investigators

The 1997–1998 UN Investigative Team

The first UN team sent to examine allegations of atrocities faced intense obstruction. The Rwandan government refused visas, limited access to sites, and conducted public campaigns to discredit the mission. As the UN Secretary-General's own reports later indicated, the team was denied the conditions necessary to carry out meaningful investigations. Despite these obstacles, the team collected testimonies suggesting the occurrence of massacres, execution-style killings, and pursuit of refugees over long distances. However, the political sensitivity surrounding the findings meant that they received minimal attention at the Security Council.

The 2010 UN Mapping Report and Political Backlash

Before the Mapping Report was even published, Rwanda threatened to withdraw troops from Darfur, close UN offices in Kigali, and suspend cooperation with UN agencies. These threats created a climate of fear among UN officials. Leaked correspondence shows that some UN leaders advocated softening the report's language or delaying publication. Although the report was eventually released, none of its recommendations—such as establishing a special tribunal—were implemented.

Humanitarian Organisations and Their Complicity in Silence

Operational Misjudgements and Withdrawals

Humanitarian organisations played a central role in the refugee camps before the invasion, but once military operations began, most agencies withdrew rapidly. Many aid workers later expressed guilt at abandoning vulnerable populations. This institutional guilt contributed to a reluctance to revisit what happened, as doing so would also expose humanitarian miscalculations and failures.

Humanitarian Narratives and Political Constraints

Humanitarian organisations also faced political pressure. Some NGOs depended on Western funding and were reluctant to challenge the narratives favoured by donor governments. Others feared losing access to Rwanda, a key hub for regional operations. As a result, humanitarian organisations did not consistently advocate for international investigations or push the UN to act on its own evidence.

The Political Invisibility of Hutu Refugees

Statelessness and Absence of Advocacy

The Hutu refugees lacked any government willing to speak on their behalf. Congo under Mobutu was collapsing and incapable of diplomatic representation. Rwanda obviously did not advocate for refugees fleeing its military operations. Regional organisations ignored the issue, viewing it as politically dangerous. Without international advocacy or state representation, the refugees became invisible in diplomatic processes.

Impact on Accountability

In international politics, victims without political advocates rarely receive justice. The absence of any state backing made it easier for the tragedies that befell Hutu refugees to be dismissed, minimised, or ignored.

The Demonisation of Hutu Refugees

Collective Stigma After the Genocide

After the 1994 genocide, many in the international community viewed Hutu refugees collectively as "génocidaires", despite the fact that the majority were civilians. This stigma profoundly shaped international responses. Refugee suffering was frequently framed as a consequence of their own alleged complicity. Humanitarian organisations later acknowledged that this generalised suspicion made it more difficult to mobilise international sympathy or protection.

Moral Hierarchies of Victimhood

In global politics, the moral status of victims matters greatly. Because the refugees were associated—often unfairly—with the genocide, their deaths did not elicit the same moral outrage that typically accompanies the killing of civilians at scale. This contributed to the political passivity surrounding their plight.

The Political Constraints of UN Legal Mechanisms

Security Council Control

Only the Security Council has the authority to create a tribunal, refer a situation to the International Criminal Court, or impose sanctions. The political protection afforded to Rwanda by the US and UK meant that no such action was politically feasible. Even compelling UN evidence was insufficient to overcome geopolitical barriers.

Institutional Limitations of the ICTR

The ICTR's mandate was intentionally restricted to crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. This prevented any legal examination of RPF actions in Zaire/DRC, thereby creating a structural barrier to accountability. Scholars such as Reyntjens and Mamdani have argued that this mandate reflected political negotiations rather than an attempt to ensure comprehensive justice.

Conclusion: A Crime Politically Buried

The UN's inaction is not due to ignorance. Reports from UNHCR, the 1997 Investigative Team, the 2010 Mapping Report, and numerous independent investigations are all publicly available. Yet at an institutional level, the United Nations has avoided accountability, avoided naming perpetrators with real political power, avoided challenging influential member states, and failed to protect one of the most vulnerable populations of the late twentieth century.

The result is a silence that persists despite overwhelming evidence that mass atrocities occurred and that tens of thousands of civilians died as the world looked away. The massacres of Hutu refugees remain among the largest unpunished civilian killings in contemporary African history.

Breaking this silence will require political courage, independent investigations, and a willingness by states and UN institutions to confront one of the organisation's most profound moral failures.

References

• Amnesty International. 1997. Zaire: Mass Killings of Hutu Refugees. London.
• Human Rights Watch. 1997. What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo. New York.
• Human Rights Watch. 1999. Eastern Congo: Killing the Refugees. New York.
• Lemarchand, René. 2001. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press.
• Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press.
• Médecins Sans Frontières. 1996–1997. Operational Reports from Goma, Bukavu, and Kisangani. Paris.
• Prunier, Gérard. 2009. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford University Press.
• Reyntjens, Filip. 2009. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press.
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1996–1997. Great Lakes Situation Reports. Geneva.
• United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2010. Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1993 to 2003. Geneva.
• United Nations Secretary-General. 1997. Report of the Investigative Team on Alleged Violations in Eastern Zaire. New York.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

Africa Context, London, UK

Le « permis de tuer » du Président du Rwanda Paul Kagame

Le « permis de tuer » du Président du Rwanda Paul Kagame : Pourquoi la communauté internationale n'a pas agi face aux massacres des réfugiés hutu en République démocratique du Congo (1996–1997).

Entre 1996 et 1997, les forces armées du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR), opérant sous le nom d'Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR), ont mené des attaques systématiques et étendues contre les réfugiés hutu rwandais en République démocratique du Congo (RDC). Ces opérations ont impliqué la destruction des camps de réfugiés, la poursuite de civils en fuite à travers des milliers de kilomètres de forêt équatoriale, ainsi que le meurtre de femmes, d'enfants, de personnes âgées et de malades. Les éléments recueillis par les Nations unies, les organisations humanitaires et les organisations de défense des droits humains montrent des schémas de violence constituant de graves violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme. Le rapport de cartographie des Nations unies de 2010 a conclu que la nature et l'ampleur de ces attaques pourraient, si elles étaient prouvées devant une juridiction compétente, être qualifiées d'actes de génocide.

Malgré cette documentation abondante, la communauté internationale n'a entrepris aucune action significative pour traiter ces atrocités. Aucun tribunal n'a été créé, aucune enquête judiciaire n'a été autorisée par le Conseil de sécurité, et aucun auteur n'a été poursuivi. Cet article analyse les éléments disponibles, explique les raisons de l'absence de responsabilité et présente des recommandations politiques destinées aux décideurs internationaux souhaitant rompre le cycle de l'impunité dans la région des Grands Lacs.

1. Introduction : un chapitre oublié du crime international

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu en RDC constituent l'un des crimes les plus graves et les plus ignorés de l'ère post-guerre froide. Après le génocide de 1994 au Rwanda, plus d'un million de réfugiés hutu ont traversé la frontière vers l'ex-Zaïre. Si une minorité d'entre eux avait participé au génocide, l'immense majorité était composée de civils. Lorsque le Rwanda et ses alliés régionaux ont envahi le Zaïre en octobre 1996, ces réfugiés sont devenus des cibles prioritaires.

Les camps de réfugiés ont été rapidement détruits. Des dizaines de milliers de civils se sont retrouvés en fuite dans les forêts congolaises. Dans leur fuite, ils ont été traqués, encerclés, tués ou laissés mourir sans accès à l'aide humanitaire. La poursuite des réfugiés à travers de vastes distances a impliqué des attaques contre des groupes de civils non armés, épuisés, malnutris et atteints de maladies. Beaucoup sont morts de violences directes, mais beaucoup d'autres ont péri de faim, d'exposition, de maladies et d'épuisement après avoir été délibérément privés d'assistance vitale.

Pendant des années, ces crimes ont été politiquement occultés, diplomatiquement embarrassants et institutionnellement négligés. Pourtant, les éléments disponibles présentent une image cohérente : des violations massives ont été commises, et la communauté internationale a choisi de ne pas agir. Cet article avance que Paul Kagame et le FPR ont bénéficié d'une protection politique équivalant à un véritable « permis de tuer », leur permettant de commettre des crimes étendus contre les réfugiés en toute impunité.

2. La population réfugiée et l'effondrement des camps

Après 1994, l'exode des réfugiés hutu vers le Zaïre a engendré une crise humanitaire sans précédent. Les camps de Mugunga, Katale, Kibumba et Bukavu accueillaient plus d'un million de personnes. Les organisations humanitaires ont documenté des conditions de surpopulation extrême, des épidémies de choléra et l'infiltration d'éléments armés de l'ancien régime. Pourtant, les évaluations de l'UNHCR et d'autres ONG ont constamment indiqué que la majorité des occupants étaient des civils non combattants : des femmes, des enfants, des enseignants, des agriculteurs et des personnes âgées ayant fui par peur de représailles.

En 1996, le gouvernement rwandais a déclaré que les camps constituaient une menace sécuritaire et a commencé à préparer des opérations militaires pour les démanteler. Ces préparatifs comprenaient l'infiltration des camps, la pression diplomatique exercée sur le Zaïre et la coordination avec le mouvement rebelle AFDL de Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Lorsque l'invasion a débuté, la destruction des camps n'a pas été un dommage collatéral ; elle était intentionnelle et planifiée. En quelques jours, l'infrastructure humanitaire s'est effondrée, les travailleurs humanitaires ont évacué et les réfugiés ont fui sans protection.

3. Les preuves des atrocités commises contre les réfugiés hutu

3.1 Le rapport de cartographie des Nations unies

Le rapport de cartographie de 2010 constitue la source la plus complète sur cette période. Ce document de 550 pages analyse les crimes les plus graves commis en RDC entre 1993 et 2003. Il identifie des centaines d'incidents impliquant des attaques contre des réfugiés hutu, dont des massacres dans des hôpitaux, des églises, des écoles, des villages et des sites de regroupement improvisés. Le rapport décrit une violence systématique, répétée et généralisée. Il souligne que les attaques ciblant les réfugiés hutu pourraient, si elles étaient prouvées devant un tribunal, être qualifiées d'actes de génocide.

3.2 L'Équipe d'enquête des Nations unies (1997–1998)

L'équipe d'enquête déployée en 1997 a rencontré des obstacles majeurs imposés par le gouvernement rwandais, qui a refusé l'accès à des sites clés, bloqué les visas et orchestré des campagnes de dénigrement contre les enquêteurs. Malgré ces difficultés, l'équipe a découvert des fosses communes, des restes humains et des témoignages crédibles faisant état de massacres.

3.3 Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch a documenté des massacres à Mugunga, Shabunda, Tingi-Tingi, Kisangani et Mbandaka. Les rapports décrivent des exécutions, des viols, des assassinats de femmes enceintes, d'enfants et de personnes âgées, ainsi que le refus systématique d'accès humanitaire.

3.4 Médecins Sans Frontières

Les équipes médicales de MSF ont constaté la disparition de milliers de réfugiés et ont décrit des décès massifs dus au refus d'accès à la nourriture, à l'eau et aux soins. MSF affirme que cette catastrophe humanitaire était en grande partie « délibérément provoquée ».

3.5 Amnesty International

Amnesty International a conclu que la majorité des victimes étaient des civils et que les opérations militaires impliquaient des violations délibérées du droit international humanitaire, notamment le meurtre de civils non armés.

4. Pourquoi la communauté internationale n'a-t-elle pas réagi ?

4.1 La protection géopolitique des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni

La raison principale de l'inaction internationale réside dans la protection politique accordée à Kagame par les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni. Après 1994, ces pays ont présenté le Rwanda comme un « modèle africain », un allié stratégique et un partenaire sécuritaire. Toute critique du FPR était jugée politiquement sensible. Les diplomates occidentaux ont freiné les initiatives d'enquête, protégé Kigali au Conseil de sécurité et marginalisé les rapports mettant en cause les forces rwandaises.

4.2 Les faiblesses internes des Nations unies

Les dirigeants des Nations unies ont manqué de courage politique pour confronter le Rwanda, en partie en raison du traumatisme institutionnel lié au génocide de 1994. Les enquêtes ont été sous-financées, entravées et souvent enterrées. Aucune action n'a suivi les rapports pourtant accablants.

4.3 Les limites du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda

Le TPIR avait un mandat restreint aux crimes commis au Rwanda en 1994, excluant les crimes du FPR commis au Zaïre et les crimes postérieurs à 1994. Cette limitation était politique et non juridique. Elle a créé un vide judiciaire durable.

4.4 La déshumanisation des réfugiés hutu

La présence de génocidaires parmi les réfugiés a conduit à une stigmatisation générale de toute la population réfugiée. Cette perception erronée a facilité l'indifférence internationale face aux souffrances des civils innocents.

4.5 L'absence de représentation politique des victimes

Les réfugiés hutu n'avaient aucun État pour défendre leurs droits : le Zaïre s'effondrait, le Rwanda ne parlerait pas en leur faveur et la région n'avait aucun intérêt à dénoncer ces crimes.

5. Les implications politiques pour les décideurs internationaux

L'absence d'enquête et de justice mine la crédibilité du système international. Elle envoie le message que des alliés géopolitiques peuvent commettre des atrocités sans être inquiétés. En RDC, cette impunité a alimenté deux décennies de conflits. Dans la région des Grands Lacs, elle continue d'alimenter l'instabilité. Pour les Nations unies, le fait d'ignorer ses propres rapports mine son autorité morale et juridique.

6. Recommandations pour une action internationale

6.1 Création d'un mécanisme d'enquête indépendant

Le Conseil de sécurité devrait créer un mécanisme indépendant chargé de poursuivre l'enquête sur les massacres de réfugiés hutu, sur le modèle des mécanismes établis pour la Syrie ou le Myanmar.

6.2 Déclassification des archives des Nations unies

Les archives scellées du rapport de 1997, du HCR et des missions de maintien de la paix devraient être rendues publiques afin de permettre une évaluation complète des crimes.

6.3 Révision de la protection diplomatique

Les États qui ont historiquement protégé le Rwanda devraient réévaluer leur position à la lumière des preuves existantes et soutenir désormais la recherche de la vérité.

6.4 Initiatives régionales africaines

L'Union africaine et les organisations régionales devraient prendre l'initiative de créer un tribunal spécial des Grands Lacs pour traiter les crimes transfrontaliers.

6.5 Engagement de la Cour pénale internationale

La CPI devrait envisager un examen préliminaire sur la base de crimes commis sur le territoire de la RDC, État partie au Statut de Rome.

7. Conclusion

Les massacres des réfugiés hutu en République démocratique du Congo demeurent l'un des plus grands silences de la diplomatie internationale. Malgré des preuves solides recueillies par les Nations unies et les organisations de défense des droits humains, aucune action concrète n'a été entreprise. Paul Kagame et le FPR ont bénéficié d'une protection politique forte, permettant l'impunité face à des crimes d'une gravité exceptionnelle.

Pour les décideurs internationaux, la question n'est plus de savoir si ces crimes ont eu lieu, mais si la communauté internationale est prête à les confronter. La justice n'est pas seulement un impératif moral ; elle constitue la condition préalable à une paix durable dans la région des Grands Lacs. L'impunité a façonné l'histoire récente de la région. Seule la responsabilité peut inverser cette dynamique.

Références

• United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010). Report of the Mapping Exercise covering the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1993 and 2003.
• United Nations Investigative Team (1997–1998). Report of the UN Team Investigating Serious Violations in Eastern Zaire.
• UNHCR (1996–1997). Situation Reports on Great Lakes Refugee Crisis.
• Human Rights Watch (1997). What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo.
• Human Rights Watch (1999). Eastern Congo: Killing the Refugees.
• Amnesty International (1997). Zaire: Mass Killings of Hutu Refugees.
• Médecins Sans Frontières (1996–1997). Rapports opérationnels Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani.
• Reyntjens, F. (2009). The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics.
• Prunier, G. (2009). Africa's World War.
• Lemarchand, R. (2001). The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa.
• Mamdani, M. (2001). When Victims Become Killers.

Préparé par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
Africa Context, London, UK

Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame’s “Licence to Kill”

Rwanda's President Paul Kagame's "Licence to Kill": Why the International Community Failed to Act on the Massacres of Hutu Refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–1997)

Abstract

Between 1996 and 1997, armed forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), operating as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), carried out widespread and systematic attacks against Rwandan Hutu refugees inside the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These operations involved the destruction of refugee camps, the pursuit of fleeing civilians through thousands of kilometres of rainforest, and the killing of women, children, the elderly, and the sick. Evidence collected by the United Nations, humanitarian organisations, and human-rights groups demonstrates patterns of violence that constitute serious violations of international humanitarian and human-rights law. The 2010 United Nations Mapping Report concluded that the nature and scale of these attacks could, if proven before a competent court, be characterised as crimes of genocide.

Despite extensive documentation, the international community has taken no meaningful action to address these atrocities. No tribunal has been created, no judicial investigation has been authorised by the UN Security Council, and no perpetrators have been held accountable. This article analyses the evidence, explains why accountability has been obstructed, and presents policy recommendations for international decision-makers who seek to break the cycle of impunity in the Great Lakes region.

1. Introduction: A Forgotten Chapter of International Crime

The massacres of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the DRC represent one of the most disturbing yet unaddressed crimes of the post-Cold War era. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, more than a million Hutu refugees fled across the border into then-Zaire. While a minority of these refugees had participated in the genocide, the overwhelming majority were civilians. When Rwanda and its regional allies invaded Zaire in October 1996, these refugees became primary targets.

The refugee camps were rapidly destroyed. Tens of thousands of civilians began fleeing deeper into Congolese territory. As they fled, they were hunted down, surrounded, killed, or left to die without access to humanitarian assistance. The pursuit of refugees across vast distances involved attacks on groups of civilians who were unarmed, exhausted, malnourished, and suffering from disease. Many refugees died from violence, but many others perished from starvation, exposure, and preventable illnesses after being deliberately cut off from aid.

For years, these crimes were politically suppressed, diplomatically inconvenient, and institutionally ignored. Yet the available evidence paints a consistent picture: large-scale violations were committed, and the international community chose not to act. This article argues that Paul Kagame and the RPF benefited from political protection that amounted to an international "licence to kill," allowing them to commit widespread crimes against refugees with near-total impunity.

2. The Refugee Population and the Collapse of Camps

Following the 1994 genocide, the exodus of Hutu refugees into Zaire created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The camps near Goma and Bukavu housed more than a million people. Humanitarian organisations documented severe overcrowding, outbreaks of cholera, and infiltration by former Rwandan armed forces. Yet, repeated assessments by UNHCR and international NGOs emphasised that most residents were non-combatant civilians—women, children, widows, teachers, farmers, and elderly people who fled out of fear of reprisals.

By 1996, the Rwandan government declared that the camps represented a security threat and began preparing military operations to dismantle them. These preparations included intelligence infiltration, diplomatic pressure on Zaire, and coordination with the AFDL rebel movement led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. When the invasion began in October 1996, attacks on the camps were not incidental; they were a central objective. Camps in Mugunga, Katale, Kibumba, and Lac Vert were bombarded and overrun. Tens of thousands of refugees immediately dispersed into the forest as organised structures collapsed.

The humanitarian presence disintegrated within days. Aid workers fled or were evacuated. Medical supplies, water systems, and shelter infrastructure were abandoned. The mass flight that followed was not a natural consequence of conflict but a predictable humanitarian catastrophe created by the destruction of civilian encampments without provision of safe corridors or humanitarian access.

3. Evidence of Mass Atrocities Against Hutu Refugees

3.1 The UN Mapping Report

The most comprehensive documentation of this period is contained in the United Nations Mapping Report, published in 2010. This 550-page study examined the most serious crimes committed in the DRC between 1993 and 2003. It identified 617 violent incidents, many of them involving attacks against Hutu refugees. The report describes patterns of violence that were systematic and widespread, including the murder of civilians in hospitals, churches, schools, and informal refugee settlements throughout North and South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale Province, and Katanga.

The Mapping Report concludes that the repeated and deliberate targeting of Hutu refugees, combined with the consistent pattern of killings across multiple locations and time periods, could, if proven before a court, amount to acts of genocide. This conclusion is based on the specific targeting of Hutu civilians as such, the pursuit of dispersed populations over long distances, and the killing of women, children, the elderly, infants, and the sick. The language of the report reflects the gravity of the evidence while observing the legal requirement for judicial confirmation.

3.2 The 1997 UN Investigative Team

Before the Mapping Report, the UN deployed an investigative team in 1997. This team encountered severe obstruction from the Rwandan government, which refused access to key sites, denied visas to investigators, and conducted public campaigns to discredit the mission. Despite these limitations, the team found credible evidence of massacres in several locations, identifying mass graves, remains of refugees, and testimonies describing killings at roadblocks, forests, and river crossings. The inability of investigators to access most sites significantly curtailed the scope of the investigation, but the findings still reinforced concerns about systematic targeting of refugees.

3.3 Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch documented numerous massacres, including those at Mugunga, Shabunda, Tingi-Tingi, Kisangani, and Mbandaka. Their reports describe killings of unarmed civilians, rape and sexual violence, execution-style murders, and the disposal of bodies in rivers and pits. HRW also documented the systematic obstruction of humanitarian access, noting that RPF/AFDL forces blocked relief workers from reaching refugee concentrations and threatened those who attempted to deliver aid.

3.4 Médecins Sans Frontières

MSF medical teams reported alarming numbers of refugees who died after being denied access to food, water, and medical assistance. MSF doctors described how thousands of refugees disappeared along the forest routes between Goma and Kisangani. Field teams stated that the humanitarian crisis was exacerbated by deliberate military actions aimed at preventing refugees from receiving assistance.

3.5 Amnesty International

Amnesty International described the killings as deliberate and targeted. Their analysis stressed that the majority of refugee victims were civilians and that the operations involved clear violations of humanitarian law, including the targeting of persons hors de combat, the killing of civilians, and the forced displacement of vulnerable populations.

4. Why the International Community Failed to Respond

4.1 Geopolitical Protection by the United States and the United Kingdom

The most significant factor explaining the absence of international accountability is the political protection extended to Kagame by major Western powers. After 1994, the United States and the United Kingdom viewed Rwanda as a model of post-genocide recovery, a strategic regional ally, and an example of effective governance in Africa. Rwanda was also seen as an essential partner in stabilising the Great Lakes region.

This political alignment meant that allegations of crimes committed by the RPF were diplomatically inconvenient. Western governments resisted calls for investigations, discouraged UN action, and supported Kagame against criticism. Diplomatic cables, testimonies from UN officials, and analyses by Great Lakes scholars indicate that US and UK diplomats lobbied actively to prevent scrutiny of RPF actions in Zaire/DRC.

4.2 Weaknesses Inside the United Nations System

The UN's response was hindered by internal divisions, lack of political courage, and structural weaknesses. Senior UN officials were reluctant to confront Rwanda publicly, partly due to the institutional guilt the UN carried for failing to prevent the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Criticising the RPF was perceived as politically sensitive and reputationally risky.

Furthermore, UN investigative teams lacked funding, field security, and political backing. Reports that documented atrocities were often shelved, diluted, or left without follow-up. Even when evidence was compiled, the Security Council did not act on it because the political will was lacking among its permanent members.

4.3 Limitations of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The ICTR was established with a mandate restricted to crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. This mandate excluded crimes committed in Zaire/DRC, even when perpetrated by the same actors. It also excluded post-1994 crimes inside Rwanda. This limitation was political rather than technical. By excluding RPF actions from its jurisdiction, the ICTR created an accountability vacuum that has never been filled.

4.4 Dehumanisation and Stigmatisation of Hutu Refugees

The moral status of the victims also shaped international indifference. Because some leaders of the 1994 genocide had fled alongside refugees, the entire refugee population was often portrayed as complicit. This narrative made it easier to overlook the suffering of innocent civilians. Humanitarian organisations later acknowledged that this dehumanising narrative contributed to the neglect of refugee protection duties.

4.5 Absence of Political Representation for the Victims

Unlike many groups affected by mass atrocities, the Hutu refugees had no state or political bloc advocating for their protection. Zaire was collapsing, Rwanda would not speak on their behalf, and regional actors had no interest in raising the issue. Without political representation, the refugees became invisible in international diplomatic processes.

5. Policy Implications for International Decision-Makers

The failure to address the massacres of Hutu refugees has serious implications for the credibility of the international system. It undermines global norms against impunity, encourages armed proxies to act without fear of consequences, and perpetuates instability in the Great Lakes region. Moreover, the UN's inability to enforce its own findings weakens its authority and damages its legitimacy.

Accountability is not only a moral necessity but also a precondition for durable peace. Without an honest reckoning with the crimes committed during the First Congo War, efforts to stabilise eastern Congo or address recurring violence in the region will remain incomplete.

6. Recommendations for Action

6.1 Establishing a UN-Mandated Investigative Mechanism

The Security Council should mandate an independent body, similar to those established for Syria and Myanmar, to investigate the massacres of Hutu refugees. This mechanism should collect evidence, preserve documentation, and prepare case files for future prosecution. Such a mechanism would operationalise the findings of the Mapping Report and create a pathway toward accountability.

6.2 Declassification of UN Archives

The United Nations should release sealed archives from the 1997 Investigative Team, UNHCR operations, and peacekeeping contingents that were present in the region. Access to these archives would allow researchers, prosecutors, and policymakers to understand the full extent of the crimes.

6.3 Reconsideration of Diplomatic Protection

Member states, especially those that previously shielded Rwanda, should reassess their positions in light of available evidence. Diplomatic protection should not override international law or prevent accountability for mass atrocities. States that once blocked investigations should support them today.

6.4 Regional Mechanisms for Justice

The African Union and regional organisations should take leadership in addressing these crimes. The establishment of a Great Lakes Special Court could provide a regional platform for justice and avoid dependence on the Security Council.

6.5 ICC Engagement

Although the ICC faces jurisdictional limitations, the Prosecutor could open a preliminary examination on the basis of crimes committed on the territory of the DRC, which is a state party. This would send an important signal that historic crimes can still be subject to international scrutiny.

7. Conclusion

The massacres of Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo remain one of the great silences of international diplomacy. Despite compelling evidence gathered by the United Nations, human-rights organisations, and humanitarian agencies, no real effort has been made to pursue justice or to acknowledge the scale of the crimes. Paul Kagame and the RPF benefited from a combination of geopolitical alliances, UN weaknesses, and a global narrative that discouraged critical engagement with RPF actions.

For policymakers and diplomats, the question is no longer whether atrocities occurred, but whether the international community is willing to confront them. Addressing these crimes is essential for restoring credibility to international justice mechanisms and building lasting peace in the Great Lakes region. Impunity has already shaped decades of conflict. Only accountability can reverse the trend.

References

• United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010). Report of the Mapping Exercise covering the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1993 and 2003.
• United Nations Investigative Team (1997–1998). Report of the UN Team Investigating Serious Violations in Eastern Zaire.
• UNHCR (1996–1997). Situation Reports on Great Lakes Refugee Crisis.
• Human Rights Watch (1997). What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo.
• Human Rights Watch (1999). Eastern Congo: Killing the Refugees.
• Amnesty International (1997). Zaire: Mass Killings of Hutu Refugees.
• Médecins Sans Frontières (1996–1997). Operational Reports from Goma, Bukavu, and Kisangani.
• Reyntjens, F. (2009). The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics.
• Prunier, G. (2009). Africa's World War: Congo, the Great Lakes and International Intervention.
• Lemarchand, R. (2001). The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa.
• Mamdani, M. (2001). When Victims Become Killers.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

Africa Context, London, UK

 

Rwanda’s Refusal to Reopen Goma Airport After the Paris Conference

Rwanda's Refusal to Reopen Goma Airport After the Paris Conference: A Confirmation of the Ongoing Balkanisation of the DRC

Introduction: A Missed Diplomatic Turning Point

On 30 October 2025, Paris hosted a major diplomatic event: the Conference in Support of Peace and Prosperity in the Great Lakes Region. This meeting, chaired by French President Emmanuel Macron and conducted with regional facilitator Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, President of Togo, aimed to revive a political dynamic capable of halting the deterioration of security in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It brought together governments, international donors, multilateral institutions and humanitarian agencies, all aware of the humanitarian emergency and the geopolitical stakes of the region.

At the end of the discussions, the conference announced the mobilisation of approximately €1.5 billion, a sum intended to support stabilisation, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and economic recovery. One of the central recommendations concerned the immediate reopening of Goma International Airport, an essential infrastructure for security, the economy and humanitarian operations. Yet despite the international agreement, Rwanda categorically opposed it. This refusal is far from a simple logistical disagreement; it is a decisive step confirming that the progressive balkanisation of the DRC is underway.

The Paris Conference: An International Stabilisation Effort

Diplomatic Context and Key Actors

The Paris Conference formed part of a long series of mediation attempts that had until then failed to achieve lasting stabilisation. Unlike previous initiatives, the Paris meeting benefited from high-level political support, notably from France, eager to play a structuring role in a region threatened by military escalation, humanitarian catastrophe and growing territorial fragmentation.

Emmanuel Macron, as President of the French Republic, gave the conference significant political and diplomatic weight. Faure Gnassingbé, as the official facilitator between Kigali and Kinshasa, played a central role in securing verbal commitments from the parties and defining a follow-up mechanism.

Official Title and Objectives of the Conference

Its full name, "Conference in Support of Peace and Prosperity in the Great Lakes Region," reflects its ambition. The goals were to strengthen regional peace efforts, mobilise substantial funding, and establish a clear roadmap for stabilising the DRC and neighbouring countries.

Discussions focused on three pillars: regional security, humanitarian access and economic reconstruction. The reopening of Goma Airport was considered one of the priority emergency measures because it was an essential lever for all other recommendations.

The Main Recommendations Adopted in Paris

Immediate Reopening of Goma Airport

Of all the recommendations adopted, the one concerning Goma Airport was regarded as the most urgent. Participants emphasised that this airport is the only air gateway connecting North Kivu to the rest of the world. Its reopening was meant to restore humanitarian flights, deliver emergency aid, restart economic activity, and re-establish state presence in an area significantly weakened by the advance of the M23.

Strict Respect for the Territorial Integrity of the DRC

The conference reaffirmed that the sovereignty of the DRC is a non-negotiable principle. Participants recalled the illegality of any territorial occupation by foreign forces or armed groups supported from abroad, insisting that any attempt to redefine national borders must be firmly condemned.

Unhindered Humanitarian Access

An immediate objective was to ensure that humanitarian organisations could reach displaced and affected populations. Leaders stressed the urgency of opening secure humanitarian corridors, facilitating the movement of humanitarian workers, and protecting civilians trapped in hostilities.

Ending Support to Armed Groups

The conference reiterated that armed groups operating in eastern DRC—particularly the M23, the FDLR, the ADF and other transnational militias—must be dismantled. Participants demanded that all external support, whether military, logistical or financial, cease immediately.

A Historic Financial Commitment of €1.5 Billion

International donors announced a total envelope of €1.5 billion, consisting of humanitarian aid, stabilisation funds, reconstruction programmes and investments in regional development. This funding was intended to provide structural support for reconstruction and peacebuilding.

A Diplomacy Follow-Up Mechanism Assigned to the Facilitator

Faure Gnassingbé received the official mandate to oversee the implementation of the recommendations. He was responsible for coordinating consultations between Kinshasa and Kigali, producing interim reports, and ensuring compliance with the commitments made in Paris.

Rwanda's Refusal: A Political Signal With Serious Consequences

The Strategic Importance of Goma for Kigali

Less than 48 hours after the conference, Rwanda rejected the recommendation to reopen Goma Airport. This refusal can only be interpreted as a strategic calculation. Goma, a city bordering Rwanda, is a vital economic centre, a key logistical hub and a gateway to territories occupied by the M23.

Reopening the airport would have enabled Kinshasa to strengthen its authority, rapidly transfer troops, deploy essential services and facilitate humanitarian operations. It would also have allowed the international community to observe the situation on the ground more transparently.

By opposing this measure, Rwanda seeks to maintain an area of influence indirectly controlled through the M23, thereby ensuring the continued weakening of the Congolese state in the region.

A Strategy Consistent With a Broader Regional Agenda

Rwanda's refusal is not an isolated incident. For more than twenty years, Kigali has pursued a strategy combining military pressure, support for rebel groups, establishment of parallel administrations and illegal exploitation of Congolese resources. The objective is never formally declared, but the cumulative effects point to an attempt to transform part of eastern DRC into a space under Rwandan influence.

Goma Airport is a crucial infrastructure. Keeping it closed results in further isolation of North Kivu, prevents reconstruction and consolidates the M23's presence.

The Balkanisation of the DRC: A Now Visible Process

Clear Signs of Territorial Fragmentation

In areas occupied by the M23, observers report the establishment of a parallel administration. Foreign officers circulate freely, informal tax systems are imposed, and some economic transactions are conducted in Rwandan francs. Natural resources are systematically exploited and transported to Rwanda without any ability of the Congolese state to intervene.

The prolonged closure of Goma Airport fits perfectly into this logic. It creates a logistical rupture between North Kivu and the rest of the country, gradually transforming the region into an area cut off from Kinshasa.

The Transformation of Goma Into an External Sphere of Influence

As a provincial capital, Goma holds immense symbolic and strategic value. Kigali's determination to prevent the resumption of air operations indicates a clear intention: reducing the Congolese state's capacity to control its own territory and fostering the emergence of a geopolitical entity operating outside national sovereignty.

Conclusion: A Refusal That Confirms the Advance of Balkanisation

The Paris Conference sought to open a new chapter for the Great Lakes region. It mobilised exceptional financial resources, brought together major international stakeholders and proposed clear solutions. Yet Rwanda's categorical refusal to authorise the reopening of Goma Airport shows that some actors have no interest in stabilisation.

This refusal confirms a worrying trend: the progressive balkanisation of the DRC is no longer a hypothesis but a visible, structured process being implemented on the ground. In light of this, it is the responsibility of the states and institutions that took part in the Paris Conference to recognise the seriousness of the situation and assume their obligations in following through on the commitments made.

References

• RFI Afrique, "RDC : à Paris, une conférence de soutien à la paix dans la région des Grands Lacs," October 2025.
• Human Rights Watch, "Paris Meeting Should Prioritize Promoting Aid and Justice in Congo," October 2025.
• European External Action Service (EEAS), "Conference for Peace and Prosperity in the Great Lakes Region," communiqué, November 2025.
• Xinhua / English.news.cn, "France mobilizes 1.74 billion USD for Great Lakes peace efforts," October 2025.
• United Nations, Group of Experts on the DRC, Reports 2012–2024.
• International Crisis Group, analyses on conflicts in Central Africa and the M23 issue.

 

The Responsibility of the International Community in the Crisis in Eastern DRC: Diplomatic Ambiguity, Deliberate Inaction, and Moral Failure.

The Responsibility of the International Community in the Crisis in Eastern DRC: Diplomatic Ambiguity, Deliberate Inaction, and Moral Failure.

Introduction: A Deepening Crisis Worsened by International Silence

The crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has reached a critical point, marked by intensifying violence, the occupation of vast territories by the M23 rebel movement, the active involvement of Rwanda, and a humanitarian collapse affecting millions of civilians.
One of the most striking symbols of this situation is the persistent refusal to reopen Goma International Airport—an essential infrastructure for the survival of the local population and for the sovereignty of the DRC.

Yet during the Conference for Peace and Prosperity in the Great Lakes Region, held in Paris on 30 October 2025, states and international institutions unanimously recommended the immediate reopening of the airport. This measure was meant to ensure humanitarian access, restart economic activity, and gradually restore Congolese state authority.
Despite this consensus, no government, no international organisation, and no global power demanded its implementation. Rwanda categorically rejected the recommendation, and the international community accepted this rejection through its silence.

This situation raises a fundamental question: how can such a grave and well-documented crisis persist under the watch of the international community without it fulfilling its moral and legal obligations?
This article offers an in-depth analysis of international responsibility, highlighting the behaviour of leading powers, regional organisations, and the United Nations, and examining their moral, political, and legal implications.

Major Powers: Geopolitical Calculations and Diplomatic Incoherence

The United States: A Powerful Actor Choosing Ambiguity

The United States, as the world's leading power, wields significant political influence in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda remains a key ally of Washington, especially in regional security and counter-terrorism operations. Yet despite multiple reports proving Rwandan involvement in supporting the M23 and occupying Congolese territory, Washington has never demanded the reopening of Goma airport.

U.S. official communications rely on cautious diplomacy, calling for peace and dialogue without imposing any coercive measures or political pressure on Kigali. This attitude reflects a political priority: preserving a strategic alliance, even at the expense of Congolese sovereignty and the lives of millions of civilians.

France: Proclaimed Leadership Without Follow-Through After the Paris Conference

By organising the Paris Conference, France presented itself as a central actor for peace in the Great Lakes region. President Emmanuel Macron, who chaired the conference alongside facilitator Faure Gnassingbé, stressed the importance of defending Congolese sovereignty and promoting a lasting solution.

Yet when Rwanda publicly rejected the conference's key recommendation—the reopening of Goma airport—Paris remained silent.
No statement, no diplomatic brief, no official comment demanded implementation of the commitments taken in Paris.

This incoherence weakens France's credibility and demonstrates that the conference was, in essence, a rhetorical exercise without the political will to enforce its own decisions.

Qatar: Passive Neutrality that Sustains the Status Quo

Qatar, now a significant international actor in regional diplomacy, played a supportive role in financing and facilitating discussions. Yet its active diplomatic involvement did not translate into clear demands for the implementation of the Paris recommendations.
Qatar opted for passive neutrality, avoiding confrontation with Kigali and thereby allowing the Rwandan refusal to stand unchallenged.
This stance reinforces the status quo and contributes to the paralysis of international action.

The African Union: An Institution Paralyzed by Consensus Politics

The African Union (AU), which should champion African interests and defend the sovereignty of its member states, proved incapable of acting effectively in the Congolese crisis.

Its official statements referred to the need for African dialogue, de-escalation, and concerted solutions. Yet no concrete measures were taken to demand the reopening of Goma airport, condemn Rwanda's actions, or protect Congolese civilians.
This paralysis stems from the AU's internal logic of avoiding direct confrontations among member states, including when one of them blatantly violates international law.
Non-interference, in this context, becomes a tool that protects governments—not people.

The United Nations: The Collapse of a System Supposed to Guarantee Peace

The posture of the United Nations in the Congolese crisis reflects a system losing its authority.
In 2024, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2773, requiring the cessation of support to armed groups, the immediate withdrawal of the M23 from occupied zones, the opening of humanitarian corridors, and the restoration of Congolese state authority.

This resolution, passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is legally binding. All UN member states, including Rwanda, must comply with it.

Yet Kigali openly ignored it. The M23 did not withdraw—on the contrary, it strengthened its military and administrative presence in several strategic areas. Human rights violations multiplied. Roads and Goma airport remained closed, preventing humanitarian access.

Despite this flagrant violation of international law, the Security Council took no action: no sanctions, no coercive measures, no formal warnings.
This behaviour undermines the multilateral system and shows that UN resolutions can become symbolic documents when not accompanied by political will.

Rwanda's De Facto Control Over Goma Airport: A Direct Attack on Sovereignty

Statements by Rwandan officials following the Paris Conference confirmed a dangerous reality: Rwanda speaks as though it has authority over Goma airport. By declaring that "conditions do not permit the resumption of flights," Kigali positioned itself as a decision-maker over an infrastructure belonging to a sovereign state.

This is a grave violation of international law, but it reveals a truth the international community refuses to confront: Rwanda exercises de facto control over part of Congolese territory, including strategic infrastructure.
Global silence in the face of this reality confirms the passive complicity of numerous states and institutions.

Moral and Legal Responsibility of International Powers: Law, Ethics, and Collective Failure

Moral Responsibility: Silence that Kills

International powers cannot claim ignorance. They possess irrefutable evidence documenting the violations in eastern DRC: atrocities, mass displacement, Rwanda's support to the M23, the illegal exploitation of mineral resources, and the establishment of parallel administrative structures.

In the face of these facts, their silence is a profound moral failure.
Failing to act when one knows the violations and possesses the means to stop them is a form of participation in those crimes.
No nation can claim to defend human rights while tolerating the humanitarian collapse of an entire region.

Legal Responsibility: International Law Violated and Not Enforced

Resolution 2773 imposes a legal obligation on all states to ensure its enforcement. By allowing Rwanda to ignore it, the powers sitting on the Security Council—especially those with veto power—violate their own obligations.

International humanitarian law requires the protection of civilians, unhindered humanitarian access, and the prohibition of support to armed groups.
The closure of Goma airport violates these foundational principles. The international community, by refusing to demand its reopening, becomes legally complicit in these violations.

International jurisprudence recognises the concept of responsibility by omission: when a state is able to prevent a grave violation but chooses to do nothing, it bears responsibility.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Adopted in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine obliges states to act—diplomatically, politically, or legally—when civilian populations face mass crimes.
The millions of displaced people, documented atrocities, and the humanitarian isolation of Goma fulfil all criteria of this doctrine.
Yet no power has invoked it.
This absence represents a historic failure and undermines the credibility of R2P itself.

Conclusion: The International Community as a Contributor to the Crisis Rather Than a Guarantor of Peace

The crisis in eastern DRC is not only the outcome of regional tensions or historical rivalries. It is also the product of the moral and legal failure of the international community.
By failing to enforce Resolution 2773, by allowing Rwanda to control a strategic Congolese airport, by accepting Kigali's refusal to reopen it, and by remaining silent in the face of mass displacement and atrocities, global powers become complicit in the gradual fragmentation of the DRC.

This crisis reveals a collapse of fundamental principles of the international system: sovereignty, equality between states, protection of civilians, and enforcement of law.
As long as the international community prioritises strategic alliances and economic interests over justice, law, and human life, eastern Congo will remain abandoned to violence, occupation, and global indifference.

References

1. European External Action Service (EEAS). "Conference for Peace and Prosperity in the Great Lakes Region." 30 October 2025. Available at: eeas.europa.eu.
2. French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. "Conference in Paris on 30 October, in support of peace and prosperity in the Great Lakes region." 16 October 2025. Available at: diplomatie.gouv.fr.
3. United Nations Security Council. "Resolution S/RES/2773 (2025): The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo." Adopted 21 February 2025. Available at: docs.un.org.
4. Human Rights Watch. "Paris Meeting Should Prioritize Promoting Aid and Justice in Congo." 30 October 2025. hrw.org.
5. EJIL:Talk! – Blog of the European Journal of International Law. "Three Legal Issues on First Reading of Resolution 2773 (2025) on Eastern DRC." 7 March 2025. ejiltalk.org.
6. UK Government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office). "The United Kingdom urges the parties in eastern DRC to continue to engage in the ongoing peace processes… including the demands of the Council set out in Security Council resolution 2773." Speech delivered at the UN Security Council, 13 October 2025. gov.uk.

Prepared par :

Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte  Bienvenue

Africa Realise, London, UK